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ABSTRACT 
The industries in which listed firms are concentrated in less 
developed equity markets are not random, nor entirely 
explained by the underlying composition of production. Listed 
firms and market capitalization are disproportionately 
concentrated in industries with low beta (measured with their 
beta with the market portfolio in the U.S.). We document a 
strong positive relationship between the industry-weighted 
country beta and the degree of market development across 
countries. Recent IPO activity confirms the result since new 
listings have higher betas than the average firm already in the 
market. 
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1.  Introduction 
This paper documents the fact that the industries in which listed firms are concentrated in less 
developed markets are not random, nor entirely explained by the underlying composition of 
production. In particular, listed firms and market capitalization are disproportionately 
concentrated in industries that exhibit low betas —as measured by the beta of each industry with 
the market portfolio in the U.S. in the period 1973-2003, our benchmark of a complete financial 
market. We show that there is a strong positive relationship between the industry-weighted 
country beta and the degree of development of equity markets across 56 countries. Recent IPO 
activity confirms the result since new listings have higher betas than the average firm listed in the 
market. The results are quite robust to different ways of measuring beta and financial 
development, and to different ways of aggregating firms into industries. Results are also robust to 
controlling for economic development and industrial composition, and to sample selection issues, 
as well as to other factors.  Alternative explanations related to country and industry characteristics 
do not explain the results away. 
 
Our findings are consistent with rational listing decisions in a standard CAPM-pricing 
context, where the listing decision depends upon the trade-off between diversification (Pagano, 
1993; Benninga, Helmantel, and Sarig, 2005; Pastor, Taylor, and Veronesi, 2009) and private 
benefits of control (Dyck and Zingales, 2004). Alternatives factors related to the value of a firm 
(e.g., size, growth opportunities, etc.) are also consistent with our findings. 
 
Our paper brings three strands of literature together: financial development, composition of 
stock markets, and listing decisions. Regarding the first, it has been well documented that the 
development of financial markets varies widely across countries and in time (Goldsmith, 1973; 
King and Levine, 1993a; King and Levine, 1993b; Rajan and Zingales, 2003). The cross-sectional 
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determinants of this variation are relatively well understood, and have been mapped to the 
protection of creditors and investors, and the quality of the available information (La Porta et al., 
1997; La Porta et al., 1998; Rajan and Zingales, 1998). However, the time series determinants 
have been far less researched (although see Rajan and Zingales, 2003; Braun and Raddatz, 2007). 
As for the mechanisms through which financial markets develop, the literature has even less to 
say. This paper contributes most to these two issues by proposing a plausible mechanism through 
which stock markets may develop in time. The story is theoretically plausible and has strong 
empirical content. A good knowledge of the mechanics is particularly relevant when designing 
policies to foster financial development. 
 
The industrial composition of listed companies also varies across countries, and some less 
developed exchanges exhibit high concentration. These differences in composition are important, 
for instance, when interpreting and explaining the properties of country index returns (see, among 
others, Lesser, 1974; Roll, 1992; Heston and Rouwenhorst, 1994), or when exploring the benefits 
of global diversification as in Griffin and Karolyi (1998). This paper adds to this literature by 
showing that both the degree of concentration and the composition vary systematically with the 
development of equity markets.  
 
The IPO literature has made important advances in documenting the rationality of the 
listing decision (for a survey, see Ritter and Welch, 2002), and it has been extended to the cross-
listing decision of emerging market firms and stock market liberalization (Chari and Henry, 2004; 
Martell and Stulz, 2003; Bekaert and Harvey, 2003). In theory, we now know that new listings 
may produce positive externalities because they increase risk sharing opportunities (Pagano, 
1993), or because they provide the market with information about non-listed companies 
(Subrahmanyam and Titman, 1999). These effects are likely to be dependent on the composition 
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of the market. Empirically, there is indeed an effect of new listings on the relative prices of the 
firms already in the market (Shleifer, 1986; Braun and Larrain, 2009; Hsu et al., 2010). This 
paper provides a joint evolution of the industrial composition of the stock market that is 
consistent with rational listing choices, and that generates effects on the prices of other firms. 
 
We also explore the consequences of these effects for the shape of the market at different 
stages of development. In this sense this paper is related to recent work by Chemmanur et al. 
(2010) and Boot et al. (2008) that shows how the incentives for listing are modified in time (the 
former), and across critical market characteristics such as liquidity and participation (the latter).  
 
Of course the determinant for the listing decision we focus on here is not the only one.  
There is literature that tries to explain, at the micro level, what the determinants of the public 
decision to go public are. Among others, these may be related to asymmetric information and 
evaluation costs (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1999), competition and the revelation of confidential 
information (Bhattacharya and Ritter, 1983; Maksimovic and Pitchler, 2001), competition and 
innovation (Spiegel and Tookes, 2007), and productivity and fixed costs (Clementi, 2002). We 
look at some of these other determinants as alternative explanations for our results. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 shows that the economic 
composition does not entirely explain the market composition of a country and the differences in 
composition between highly and less developed equity markets.  Section 3 presents the data, our 
main results, and the robustness checks. Here we also contrast our results with alternative 
explanations existing in the present literature. Section 4 briefly concludes. 
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2.  Stylized Facts 
Equity markets are highly concentrated not only at the firm level but also at the industry 
level. If we group firms into 48 different industries, the largest industry accounts for one fifth of 
the number of firms and a third of the market capitalization in a typical country. Nearly half the 
number of firms and seventy percent of capitalization is concentrated in the top 4 industries.
1
  
 
Table 1 shows that this concentration is not homogeneous across countries, but it is 
significantly higher in places where the equity market is less developed as measured by the ratio 
of listed firms to population (see Table A1 for sample countries and their characteristics). 
Whereas in Russia the top 4 industries concentrate 99% of market capitalization and an 85% of 
the number of firms, in the U.S. they account for only around 50% on each count. This is very 
much the case for each one of the eight different measures of concentration we looked at, and is 
not dependent on the particular way of splitting the countries. In some of these measures the 
cross-country variation is even bigger than that of the traditional proxies for financial 
development such as market capitalization or value traded over GDP.
2
 
 
The pattern of concentration across countries also varies markedly. Banks, telecom and 
utility firms are over-represented in many countries when compared to industries such as personal 
services. But there is wide variation around the mean share of each industry. With respect to the 
average, highly developed markets have a much higher concentration of firms in industries with 
higher co-movement with the market. The fourth column of Table 2 shows how the share of firms 
in each of the 48 industries varies when comparing highly developed to less developed equity 
                                                          
1
 These numbers are based on firm-level accounting and market data for the year 2001 from the 
Worldscope dataset, and Fama-French‘s 48 industry aggregation as we describe below. Data are available 
for 56 countries. 
2
 Although part of the concentration is mechanical (i.e., it is due to financial underdevelopment in the 
extreme cases), the observation persists when we focus on a subset of countries where all industries are 
represented. 
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markets (with the stars denoting the significance of a difference of means test). Industries are 
sorted by their ―complete market beta‖, which we compute by regressing the monthly excess 
returns of each one against the ―complete market‖ excess return in the U.S. in the January 1973 to 
December 2003 period. The series corresponds to the historical U.S. industry returns maintained 
by Ken French on his homepage.  
 
It is apparent from the table that, relative to less developed markets, the share of low beta 
industries such as utilities, food, and telecoms is significantly lower in developed equity markets. 
On the other hand, relative to the average, high beta sectors such as transportation, machinery, 
and wholesale are much smaller in less developed markets. Figure 1 shows that the relation is a 
good description of the data. The slope is not only very significant (more than four times its 
standard error) but also of a large economic magnitude: the (absolute) deviation is on average 1.3 
percentage points from an average share that is, of course, only slightly above 2%.  This means 
that the typical low beta industry would be between three and four times larger in poorly 
developed markets when compared to more developed ones.    
 
The pattern is not eliminated when one accounts for the variation in the industrial 
composition of the different economies. Table 3 shows the differences between the economic and 
market composition across countries with both little and highly developed equity markets. For 
this analysis we were able to gather comparable output and value added data for only 34 OECD 
countries, disaggregated into 17 industry groups, from the OECD website. Although most of 
these countries are rich, we are still left with 13 financially underdeveloped markets when we 
apply the same definition of development as used above (see Table A1). We compare the share of 
revenue of listed firms to the share of output in the entire economy for each industry across the 
development groups (we get the same results when considering value added, not reported).  
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Lower-than-median-beta industries are overrepresented in all equity markets relative to 
their share in the economy. The magnitudes are quite large: whereas these account for little more 
than one third of economic output, their share in the equity market is twice as large in the typical 
country. What is also clear, though, is that the overrepresentation of low beta industries is much 
bigger in less developed equity markets (79% in the market vs. 39% in the economy) vis-à-vis 
more developed ones (60% vs. 34%). The last column in the table shows that all but one of the 
higher-than-median-beta-industries is relatively over-represented in well developed markets when 
compared to underdeveloped stock exchanges. Differences in the composition of production are 
much smaller across countries than those found in stock markets: the mean absolute difference of 
3% in stock markets is 1.8 times larger than that of the economy. In this sense, variation in 
production has little hope of explaining all the variation in stock market composition, simply 
because it is too small. The composition of a country's economy, then, is important but large 
differences seem to persist in the representation of low and high beta industries across equity 
markets sorted by their degree of development. We return to this issue below. 
 
There is much more to a market than its size relative to the economy. Industrial 
composition appears to change in a systematic way across countries, with high beta industries 
being particularly underrepresented in less developed markets. 
 
2.1 Theoretical underpinnings 
Our empirical finding that low beta firms tend to go public first is indeed consistent with 
rational listing decisions in a standard CAPM-pricing context, in a world where listing decisions 
depend upon the trade-off between diversification (Pagano, 1993; Benninga, Helmantel, and 
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Sarig, 2005; Pastor, Taylor, and Veronesi, 2009) and private benefits of control (Dyck and 
Zingales, 2004). 
 
The intuition follows from the simple observation that as the act of going public involves —
from the point of view of the entrepreneur who owns the firm— surrending at least part of the 
benefits of private control, in exchange for a piece of a well diversified stock market and the risk 
free asset. In this context, the entrepreneurs having low beta firms will be the ones more willing 
to go public, because their projects generate the higher gains from trade. This statement can 
indeed be formalized using a static CAPM model.
3
 
 
3.  Empirical Results 
3.1 Data and the Empirical Approach 
We explore the hypothesis that markets develop or complete starting with less cyclical 
firms and add increasingly risky ones by exploiting cross-country differences in the industrial 
composition and development of equity markets. We complement these results by comparing the 
characteristics of new share issues to those of the firms already listed. 
 
The most direct implication of our hypothesis is that more cyclical firms will be listed in 
a more developed stock market. We could compute the market capitalization-weighted average 
beta of listed firms with respect to their own market. But this is of no use, of course, since it is 
always one by definition. That is, it is endogenous. We get around this problem by measuring 
betas using historical return data for the U.S. stock market over the last 30 years and by 
                                                          
3
  In particular, it can be shown that if low beta firms do not have relatively higher indyosincratic risk and 
size, compared to high beta firms —which is verified in our data at the industry level— the decision to go 
public is completely determined by the firm‘s beta. This is to say, beta is a sufficient statistic of the IPO 
decision. The formal result is available from the authors upon request. See also Casassus and Villalon 
(2010) for a dynamic model on the IPO decision showing similars results. 
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aggregating these into industries. The decision to use recent U.S. data is, of course, motivated by 
the fact that the U.S. is the largest and arguably the deepest and most developed equity market 
there is. It is also the one that has firms listed with the most varied characteristics, and in virtually 
every industry. For our purposes it is the market where one can convincingly argue that almost 
every firm that should be listed is listed. In other words, it is a market that is quite close to 
complete. We thus name the betas measured in that market as ―complete market beta‖. 
 
Firms in the U.S. may differ from those in other countries, and perhaps in systematic 
ways. Industries are likely to be more comparable in terms of the way they co-move with the 
economy, insofar as the manner in which demand and supply behave in the cycle is mainly of a 
technological nature. We believe that Ken French‘s benchmark 48-industry grouping captures in 
the broadest way possible the variation in the way returns behave, and we therefore take this as 
our starting point. 
 
To estimate industry betas, we regressed the excess returns of each industry of the Fama 
French 48 industry classification (from January 1973 to December 2003) against the market 
excess return. During this period, the three major U.S. stock exchanges (NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ) were included in the Fama French database, and all 48 industries had at least one 
listed firm in the market. The dataset also provides the average firm size and number of firms for 
each industry, which we later use for robustness.
4
 These betas are reported in the first column of 
Table 2. 
 
                                                          
4
 When we use the Fama-French 17 industry classification we proceed in an identical way as with the 48 
industry classification. The Fama-French database is also our source for the Fama-French three factor 
model data. 
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Based on the betas computed this way we calculate the industry-weighted country beta by 
using the share of each industry in that country. The weights come from Worldscope and are 
available for 56 countries in 2001. This dataset provides firm-specific data for listed firms, 
including balance sheets, end of year market capitalization, and standard industry classification 
(SIC) code. The SIC code allowed us to match the firms from Worldscope to their correspondent 
industry in the Fama French classification. Although Worldscope is the most comprehensive 
source for this kind of international data, it is not taken for granted that coverage is universal or 
similarly biased across countries. Since this may induce sample issues, we address this in the 
robustness section. 
 
Our benchmark weighting scheme uses the number of firms. The advantage of using the 
number of firms weighted beta over market cap, revenues, or book asset betas stems from the fact 
that the number of firms in each industry in a given market does not depend on market prices, 
sales or accounting rules. Indeed, in our framework, relative prices do change in a systematic way 
as markets develop and the composition changes. This paper aims at documenting that the 
composition changes as cleanly as possible, leaving the pricing implications for future research. 
Using the number of firms to weight market betas is also less data intensive, which is important 
for assessing the situation for the least developed markets. As an alternative we also use market 
capitalization weights to avoid giving too much importance to firms that may be irrelevant in 
each market because of their small size. We call the latter ―Firm Beta,‖ and the former ―Market 
Beta‖. We use other weighting schemes in the robustness section. The average complete market 
beta for each of the 56 countries is reported in column 3 of Table A1 (column 4 for the market 
cap-weighted version). 
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Our benchmark measure of market development is the log of the number of listed firms 
to total population (see the first column of Table A1).
5
 This has been used before in the literature. 
Albeit not the most popular measure, it has the advantage, again, of being independent of prices, 
this time at their general level. As an alternative measure of development, we use the more 
popular market capitalization to GDP. 
 
The way we proxy for the different concepts is far from perfect, but we believe the 
measures we construct have the advantage of being transparent, simple and easy to compute. We 
address some of the many shortcomings they have in the robustness section. 
 
Our benchmark cross-country is of the following type:  
  
where the industry-weighted country beta is constructed as 
 
with  being the weight of industry  in country , defined as the number of listed firms in 
industry  over the total number of listed firms in the market, and  being the industry beta with 
respect to the complete market proxy, computed using the monthly returns in the U.S. from 1973 
to 2003. We add to every specification per capita GDP to control for the level of economic (not 
financial) development. 
 
Our prediction is that our estimate of  is positive and statistically significant, so that the 
average market beta increases with market development.  
                                                          
5
 The number of firms comes from Worldscope and Ken French‘s site, while population is taken from the 
World Development indicators. 
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3.2 Benchmark Results 
Table 4 presents our basic results for the cross-country data. The estimate for the market 
development coefficient in column one is positive and highly significant: the industry-weighted 
country beta is strongly positively associated with market development. As can be seen in Figure 
2, the relationship is robust and generally coincides with people‘s impressions about the depth, 
development, or completeness of most markets. The industry-weighted country beta in our 
sample is 1.01. That is approximately the figure for countries such as Spain, New Zealand and 
Australia. At one standard deviation (0.0752) above the mean we find countries such as Japan, 
Germany, and the UK, which could work as proxies of a complete market, whereas one standard 
deviation below the mean is represented by countries such as Argentina or Zimbabwe. 
 
The effect is of economic importance. The industry-weighted country beta of the 
countries generally regarded as well developed is around 10% higher than in places such as 
Mexico, India, Egypt, and China. Considering that the range of industry betas goes only from 0.5 
to 1.4 (with a standard deviation of 20%), this implies a large difference.
6
 For instance, the five 
industries with the highest beta in well developed markets account for a share of 18% of the total, 
around three times as large as in the less developed ones (6.5%). 
 
When we measure financial development with the more traditional market cap to GDP 
the coefficient turns out to be equally positive, significant, and of very much the same magnitude 
as before (in Table 7 we show that this is also the case for a number of other measures). Also, the 
relationship goes over and above the level of development of the particular country. GDP per 
                                                          
6
 The most common industries represented across all markets are financials and utilitites. We also tested 
what happened when we removed these industries from our sample. The relationship between market 
development and average industry complete-market beta remained unchanged. The coefficient was still 
positive (0.0281) and statistically significant at a 1% level. 
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capita enters positively, though it is not always significant, and reduces only marginally the main 
effect.  
  
3.3 Further Evidence 
We provide two more pieces of evidence that support the view that markets develop from 
low to high beta industries. We first look at a smaller sample of 39 countries for which we have 
data going back to 1991, and see what has been the evolution of their industry-weighted country 
beta. These data are of lesser quality, but we see no particular reason for them to be biased for or 
against industries sorted on their beta. 
 
According to almost any measure, the 1990s were the period in which markets developed 
the most. Panel A in Table 5 shows that the average number of listed firms increased almost 
threefold from around four per million to more than eleven per million. Market capitalization to 
GDP increased from 35% to 78% in the same period. If our hypothesis is correct, one would 
expect to see average industry complete-market betas increasing rapidly. And this is exactly what 
we find: the industry-weighted country beta in the typical country grew about 5% in those ten 
years. And the economic magnitude is comparable to what we found before.
7
 The difference is, 
again, very significant in statistical terms. Equity markets have not only been growing in size 
lately, but their composition has been changing rapidly towards higher beta sectors. 
 
The second piece of confirming evidence comes from new stock issues. If our story is 
correct, we should expect to find that firms that list at any point in time tend to have a higher 
(complete market) industry beta than those that are already listed. Using IPO data from 
                                                          
7
 Based on the coefficients from the cross-country regression, and preliminary evidence from an exercise on 
the U.S. time-series for the period 1927-2003 (not reported), one would have expected an increase of 
between 2.5% and 6.3%, quite close to the actual number. 
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Thompson Financial's SDC Platinum for the entire 1990-2003 period,
8
 we compute the average 
industry market betas of IPOs for 54 of the 56 countries in our sample.
9
 The results show that the 
average beta of IPOs (1.0403) is much higher than the average beta of the firms already listed 
(1.0159). This difference is statistically significant as Panel B of Table 5 reports, and the effect is 
present in both developed and underdeveloped equity markets, although the effect is only 
significant within the former group. Finally, the fact that IPO betas are lower in less developed 
markets than in more developed ones provides confirming evidence of our main finding, only this 
time from a different dataset. 
 
3.4 Robustness 
The relationship between market development and its composition does not depend on 
the detail of how we measure the different concepts. Here we look at alternative factors related to 
the value of the firm, different ways of weighting (complete market) industry betas to compute 
country aggregates, variations in the definition of industries, other ways of measuring industry-
weighted country betas and equity market development, and we address potential sample issues. 
The main result is robust to all these changes to the benchmark specification. 
 
First, we used measures of value different than beta. In particular, we explore growth 
opportunities and size.
10
 In the case of the former, firms with high growth opportunities will 
ceteris paribus fetch a higher value in the market.
11
  In our context one expects these to be the 
first to list. A number of low beta industries, such as utilities and food products, are likely to have 
higher growth opportunities at early stages of economic development when compared to their 
                                                          
8
Henderson et al. (2006) present a comprehensive study of this dataset, including all types of equity issues 
and debt issues. 
9
There were no IPOs for Slovakia and Liechtenstein during that period. 
10
 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out these additional alternatives. 
11
 This argument has already been explored in the IPO literature (Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales, 1998; 
Pagano, Panetta, and Zingales, 1996; Pastor and Veronesi, 2005; Pastor et al., 2009). 
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developed countries counterparts. This means that, in relative terms, the incentive for the 
entrepreneur to list a firm in this type of industries is particularly strong in less-developed 
markets. As this happens these industries are able to finance their expansion projects, whereas the 
other firms can wait for better market conditions.  
 
To verify the empirical content of this hypothesis, we ran a regression using the industry-
weighted market-to-book ratio as the dependent variable. The ratio is computed as the average 
figure in the less developed markets and is intended to measure growth opportunities available to 
the firms in those countries. This market-to-book ratio is still exogenous to each particular market 
and so the country aggregate depends just on the weights of each industry in that market. Our 
results show that it is indeed the case that high grow firms tend to go public first (Column one in 
Panel A of Table 6). This is consistent with our hypothesis that the structure of the market is 
linked to the going-public decision, this time being measured with this alternative metric. 
 
Life cycle theories suggest that firm size could also explain the composition of equity 
markets because it matters for the best time to go public (see, for instance, Pagano et al., 1998; 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1999). One would expect larger firms in less developed equity 
markets to be the first ones to reach the ―listable size,‖ and hence to see that larger firms go 
public first. Stretching our approach a little, we assume that firm-level variation in size within 
industries is small relative to cross-industry variation and compute average firm size in each 
sector using Ken French‘s data. Again, the results confirm our general hypothesis since we find 
the negative coefficient of market development on size we expected (Column two in Panel A of 
Table 6). 
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One potential issue with our results is that using the number of firms as weighting factor 
may be determinant. This is our preferred measure because it is cleaner in the sense of being less 
dependent on prices and accounting differences. Still, we computed country betas using weights 
based on market capitalization, revenues, and the book value of assets. These turned out to be 
highly correlated with our firm number-based measure and between each other (pair-wise 
correlations ranged from 0.61 to 0.94, all of them significant at levels well under 1%). They were 
also similarly strongly correlated to our measures of financial development. Columns one, two 
and three in Panel B of Table 6 show that when these replace our benchmark measure the results 
are very much unchanged. When aggregating into industries, the variation across countries in the 
share of each one is significantly larger than the variation within each country in average 
accounting and valuation metrics.  
 
Our benchmark results are based on the Fama French 48 industry classification to 
compute industry betas because it was the most disaggregated. Here we check that the 
relationship between market development and industry-weighted country beta is still present if we 
use an alternative industrial classification to compute industry betas. Using 48 industries allows 
us to capture more of the diversity in each country. For example, in the Fama French 17 industry 
classification, industry 16 is Banks, Insurance Companies, and Other Financials, and has a 
complete market beta of 1.003. Under the 48 industry classification that same industry is 
disaggregated into four different industries; Banking (beta 1.032), Insurance (beta 0.852), Real 
Estate (beta 1.029) and Trading (beta 0.998). The industry of Banks, Insurance Companies, and 
Other Financials is represented in 98% of the countries in our sample. When we break this 
industry into the four finer categories, only 54% of the countries have at least one listed firm in 
all industries of the group. A less disaggregated industry definition emphasizes continuous 
variation in size across industries in the identification of the effect. A more detailed classification 
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focuses more on the discrete difference between having some versus having no firms in the 
industry. We explore both sources of identification in turn. 
 
Using this new 17-industry classification we are still able to capture the relationship 
between stock market development and average industry complete-market beta. Column four in 
Panel B of Table 6 shows that the coefficient of interest is still positive, statistically significant, 
and that it remains within the same order of magnitude as our benchmark results.  
 
At the other extreme, we computed country betas using a dummy variable that takes a 
value of one if the industry is represented by at least one firm, and zero if no firm from the 
industry is listed. This means that, if you look only at the industries that are represented in a 
market, we are asking whether industry-dummy-weighted country betas increase with 
development. The coefficient is still very significant statistically, but accounts for around half the 
economic effect we found before (column five in Panel B). This means that identification stems 
from both the discrete and the continuous character of the data. The bulk of the identification, 
then, does not stem from the mere fact that some industries are simply not represented at all in 
less developed markets. 
  
The CAPM states that returns come only from differences in industry betas. We know 
that other factors different from beta ―such as size and value― have empirical value on their 
own. We could be mistaking betas with those other factors. We do not see this as particularly 
damaging since, under a broader interpretation of our hypothesis, these other sources of risk also 
determine value, the IPO decision and therefore the way the composition of the market evolves. 
In any case, we compute a multifactor market beta using Fama and French (1992)‘s three factor 
specification, and use these conditional betas to measure average industry complete-market betas 
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across countries. The results are in the sixth column of Panel B in Table 6. Overall, we conclude 
that the details on how one measures systematic risk are not material for the findings. 
 
The results of our benchmark cross country regression use the Worldscope database to 
compute the weights. Although this is the most comprehensive international firm-level dataset 
available, there is no assurance that coverage is complete. Coverage might be particularly biased 
against some type of firms (the smaller ones, perhaps), in particular in some countries (the less 
developed). If size is negatively correlated with industry-weighted country beta, this poses a 
potentially important sample issue. By concentrating only on those industries that are represented 
we can ease somewhat ease this concern. Here we address the issue more directly. 
 
The World Bank‘s WDI database includes a variable that states the number of listed firms 
in different countries, and a variable that measures total market capitalization. These are the 
figures most commonly used in much of the financial development literature. Based on these 
figures, we have a mean (median) coverage of 75% (66%) in the number of firms, and 98% 
(93%) in market capitalization across countries. The WDI sample is not complete either, as we 
have more firms in one out of ten countries, and higher market capitalization in about a quarter of 
them. Still, we think it is a valid reference point to verify the completeness of our Worldscope 
sample. 
 
We reran our benchmark regression in restricted samples thought to capture the 
completeness of our data. Even after imposing coverage of at least 75% of the firms or market 
capitalization —that is, little over half the sample— the coefficient for equity market 
development was still positive and highly significant (Panel C in Table 6). The magnitude 
changed but mostly remained the same order of magnitude as before. 
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The results are also robust to specific listed industries. For instance, all of the countries in 
our sample have at least one utilities firm listed in its stock market and, as mentioned above, 98% 
of the countries in the sample have at least one financials industry listed firm. Since utilities and 
financials are low and median beta industries respectively, these two sectors might be driving the 
results. In order to control for this fact, we reran our benchmark regression without any firms 
from the utilities or financials industry. The relationship between the average industry complete-
market beta and market development continues after we remove all utilities and financials firms. 
The coefficient of interest remains within the same magnitude as in the benchmark specification 
(0.0281 with a standard error of 0.0042) and is still highly significant. 
 
We defined the complete market as the U.S. market from 1973 to 2003. Our choice was 
influenced by the fact that the U.S. market is the one with most listed firms (see table A1 in the 
appendix), has representation in every Fama French industry, and has data on returns available 
from 1926. Still, one may be concerned about the robustness of our results using a different 
choice of the complete market benchmark.  To this end we used monthly FTSE industry returns 
for 19 countries from January 1995 to December 2008.
12
 We tested how similar industry betas are 
in countries that have all 10 FTSE sectors represented in their market in two ways. First, we ran a 
regression of country industry betas against the U.S. industry betas and a country dummy. The 
U.S. industry beta coefficient of the regression is positive (0.497) and significant at a 10% level. 
This result shows that industry betas in developed markets are similar. The second way to test 
how similar industry betas are among developed markets is by testing the rank correlation 
between country industry betas and the U.S. industry betas. The average rank correlation of the 
                                                          
12
 We used this period due to the availability of industry returns from FTSE. 
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countries with all industries represented is positive (0.473) and statistically significant at a 1% 
level.
13
 
 
Since industry betas in developed markets are similar, using the U.S. or any other market 
that has representation of all industries would preserve our main finding that markets develop 
from low to high beta industries. Moreover, industry betas rank correlations show that low beta 
industries, such as utilities, are low beta in the U.K., Japan, or any other developed market. Using 
a different complete market proxy makes no difference, simply because betas are quite similar in 
all well developed stock markets. 
 
Another concern that may arise is the specific period selected to define the complete 
market proxy (1973 to 2003). In this case, our choice was motivated by the fact the three major 
U.S. stock exchanges were included in the sample (NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ). To test the 
relevance of this argument we estimated industry betas for the U.S. for three different sample 
periods and contrasted them with our benchmark results. Again, rank correlations were all high 
(from 0.61 to 0.98), positive, and statistically significant. This means that, at least in the U.S., 
empirically the rank of sectors based on beta does not change materially as the markets develop. 
 
We also checked that our particular measures of equity market development —the 
number of listed firms to population and market capitalization to GDP— were not material to the 
results. Almost any size or activity-measure of equity market development works similarly well 
(stock market turnover, stock market value traded). Variables related to accounting quality and 
shareholder protection, thought to determine development, also enter positively and in a highly 
                                                          
13
 The average pair-wise rank correlation of the 45 countries with FTSE indexes is also positive (0.383) and 
statistically significant at a 1% level. This fact shows that even when not all industries are represented in 
the market, the ordinality of the industry betas is similar. 
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significant manner in the regression. In all these cases the economic magnitude is very similar. 
Legal origin and creditor rights enter with the expected sign but are typically not significant. 
Variables that proxy for bank development enter positively, but typically drop out when included 
together with stock market development measures (not reported). 
 
3.5 Alternative Explanations 
 
Country Characteristics 
The first alternative explanation for our results is the one related to the industrial 
composition of production. That is to say, low industry-weighted beta countries are countries that 
tend to specialize in relatively low beta industries, and hence the observed stock market 
composition is simply a reflection of the underlying industrial composition. We have already 
shown that the composition of production does not vary nearly as much as that of stock markets 
and, therefore, cannot completely explain away our result. The effect was also shown to be robust 
to measures of general economic development, generally thought to be the cause of differences in 
production. Finally, the evidence regarding the way average industry complete-market betas have 
changed in the last ten years also argues against this being explained away with economic 
composition. Indeed, the change in the underlying composition of the economy would need to be 
implausibly rapid. 
 
Here we address the issue more directly by computing industry-weighted country betas 
using the shares of sectors in the economy as weighting factor (i.e., ‗economy betas‘) ―as 
opposed to those in the stock market― and then running the benchmark regression controlling for 
this variable. Ideally one would compute country betas using for each of the 48 industries and all 
the countries in our sample. Unfortunately, these kinds of data are not widely available, especially 
at that level of industrial disaggregation. We were able, however, to gather economic composition 
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data for all the OECD countries (36 out of the 56) for 17 different sectors (see Table A1 for the 
countries and Table 3 for the industries included in this analysis). We then computed industry-
weighted country betas by weighting the industry betas with both the country shares in total value 
added, and in total output.
14
 The correlation between country betas using production and stock-
market weighting factors is high (around 0.44) and statistically significant (at a 1% level), while 
that with per capita GDP is also positive, but smaller (0.25) and not significant. 
 
Table 7 presents the results. We first check that after aggregating the 48 industries in 17 
sectors, and reducing the sample to 34 countries there is still a positive association between 
industry-weighted country beta and market development (columns one and four). Once again, the 
result is very robust: the sign is positive, the coefficients as statistically significant as before, and 
of pretty much the same economic magnitude. The results below are likely not to be dependent on 
the way we aggregate industries, and the sample countries. The following columns add to the 
benchmark specification the country beta constructed by weighted the shares in value added 
(‗economy value added beta‘) and the share in output (‗economy output beta‘) as controls. As 
expected, the coefficients of the ‗economy betas‘ are positive, although not always significant. 
There is indeed a positive association between economy betas and stock-market betas, but the 
link between the latter and economic development is not dependent on this. Our coefficient of 
interest is very much unchanged when we control for average industry complete-market economy 
betas. The results when using stock-market revenues and assets, and other measures of stock 
market development are virtually the same (not reported). 
 
 
                                                          
14
 We hand-matched the Fama French 48 industry classification to the classification used by the OECD. We 
used the arithmetic mean of the betas in the 48 industry classification to generate a proxy for the 17-sector 
betas. 
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Industry Characteristics 
Firms and industries are different in a number of dimensions that could be correlated with 
their market beta. If these other characteristics somehow interact with stock market development 
(or any other strongly associated country variable) in the same direction as betas do, we could be 
capturing this, rather than our effect. To address this possibility, we gather a number of different 
industry characteristics using the industry information from the U.S. and weight them using the 
industry shares in each market to get a measure of the intensity of each characteristic. We 
consider external financing needs, asset tangibility, productivity, information available, financial 
integration, and idiosyncratic risk. All of these characteristics can be linked to alternative reasons 
for listing. The results are presented in Table 8. 
 
As discussed by Rajan and Zingales (1998), dependence on external funds across 
different industries may prevent firms from more dependent industries from listing on the stock 
market, especially in less developed markets. We include in our benchmark regression a proxy of 
country external finance dependence, built using firm data for U.S. firms from 1996 to 2003. We 
do so by relying on the industry weighted average of Rajan and Zingales's measure for external 
finance dependence.
15
 It is not the case that in our sample less developed equity markets exhibit 
significantly fewer firms in industries that require more external funding. Indeed, the correlation 
between development and this measure is slightly negative (though borderline insignificant). The 
variable is negatively related to industry-weighted country beta, and when included in the 
benchmark regression does not invalidate our main finding (column 1 in Table 8). 
 
                                                          
15
 Rajan and Zingales's measure of external finance dependence (RZ) for each firm is given by 
RZ=(CAPEXCASH FLOW )/ CAPEX. 
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Another possibility is that firms differ in terms of the tangibility of their assets, and 
protection for less tangible ones is poorer in less developed markets (Braun, 2003; Braun and 
Larrain, 2005). If this is so, one would expect firms with many intangible assets to have more 
difficulty in getting external funds, and so to be underrepresented in equity markets. Indeed, stock 
market tangibility is negatively correlated with both financial development and country beta. Yet, 
when included in the regressions, our main result is virtually unchanged (column 2 in Table 8). 
These results are also related to Spiegel and Tookes (2007)‘s innovation argument if one accepts 
that lower tangibility is a proxy for high innovation since fixed assets are less important to 
generate innovation relative to intangible ones. 
 
As proposed by Clementi (2002), industries with high total factor productivity (TFP) may 
have a higher likelihood of being listed in the stock market than the ones with a low TFP. The 
reason would be that, for these firms, operating at a scale smaller than the optimal would be 
particularly costly, and so would lead them to raise capital from the markets. Using the 2000-
2005 average industry 4-factor TFP from the NBER, we include in our benchmark regression a 
proxy of each market‘s total factor productivity. Since TFP data is only available for 
manufacturing industries we focus on these in this test (column 3 in Table 8). More developed 
equity markets are indeed relatively more concentrated in industries with high TFP. But, again, 
country betas remain positively and significantly associated to stock market development. The 
coefficient is virtually the same as before. 
 
Evaluation costs may also be important in the listing decision since higher costs would 
lead to a lower market price (Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1999). In order to check that this is not 
behind our results we computed an analysts‘ coverage variable by counting the number of 
analysts that, according to Bloomberg, follow each firm in the U.S. and aggregating at the 
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industry level. Under the assumption that a higher number of analysts means a lower cost of 
evaluating a company, this variable is a proxy for these costs. When we include this variable in 
the regression, it does not enter significantly and has little effect on the country beta (column 4 in 
Table 8). 
 
Another possible explanation is due to a higher economic and financial integration of 
developed countries. If more developed countries are more integrated, there may be the case that 
our results (higher correlation with the business cycle) are simply capturing this phenomenon. To 
address this issue we included in our basic specification the measure of equity market 
segmentation proposed by Bekaert et al. (2010). Consistent with theory, the measure of 
segmentation enters with a negative, and significant sign in the regression, yet our results remain 
virtually unchanged (column 5 in Table 8). 
 
A final potential problem is that it may be diversifiable risk instead of market risk that we 
are picking in our variables. Brown and Kapadia (2008) show that firms with higher idiosyncratic 
risk have been listing in the U.S. at a time when, by most traditional measures, stock market was 
becoming more developed. In our sample, idiosyncratic risk is uncorrelated to both equity market 
development and country betas. When included in the benchmark regression it has no effect on 
the coefficient of interest (column 6 in Table 8). 
 
In the end, a number of characteristics of firms (more precisely of industries) do matter 
significantly for the listing decision as (mostly) theoretical work has hypothesized —although not 
all of them necessarily in the same direction. More important, they appear to hamper the ability of 
firms to list differently across countries sorted on financial development. Tangibility and 
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productivity seem to be particularly relevant. Yet, none of them modify the size of the average 
industry complete-market beta coefficient. 
 
Privatization  
Megginson et al. (2004) present the idea that privatizations can spur financial market 
development in a country. Subrahmanyan and Titman (1999) support this idea and argue that a 
privatization through the stock market exposes costly information to investors that otherwise 
would have to pay for. This serendipitous information, as they call it, could encourage 
entrepreneurs to go public after the privatization has taken place, due to the new information 
available and the bigger base of informed investors. 
 
Under our hypothesis that markets develop from low to high beta industries, privatization 
would encourage new firms to go public, and therefore help to develop the market, only if the 
privatization comes from a low beta industry. It may also be that less developed stock markets 
have a higher concentration of low beta industries simply because those countries begun 
privatizing utilities, telecoms, and other low-beta, regulated firms much later than rich countries.  
 
To examine whether it is the latest privatization wave that drives our results we looked at 
the firms Megginson (2004) identifies as privatized in each country and computed their complete-
market betas.
16
 Indeed, telecommunications firms were the most commonly privatized firms 
through IPOs, and are one of the industries with the lowest betas. However, this turned out to be a 
common factor across countries and did not vary with the level of development in any significant 
way. The industry-weighted country beta using only the privatized firms had a small (0.1) and 
                                                          
16
 Megginson (2004) provides a list of firms that were privatized through an IPO for 59 countries from 
March 1961 to August 2003. Our Worldscope data contains 90% of those firms. 
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insignificant correlation with equity market development. This is mostly because the share of 
privatized firms in the total number or market cap is quite small (with a median of 1.6% across 
countries), and only weakly correlated to underdevelopment. We excluded privatized firms from 
both the measure of equity market development and when computing country betas and checked 
whether excluding these firms made any difference. It did not, as our coefficient of interest was 
virtually unchanged (see column 7 in Table 8).  
 
4.  Conclusion 
We document a strong positive relationship between the level of equity market development 
and the country beta relative to a complete market benchmark. This relationship holds across 
countries and is not completely explained by the underlying composition of production. This 
relationship suggests that markets develop from low to high beta industries. 
 
The results suggest at least two novel effects that we feel are worth testing and further 
exploring. First, they imply that expected relative returns (and relative market prices) do change 
(in predictable ways) with the state of development. Second, they point to the possibility that the 
decision to go public is perhaps not as simple as typically thought, but has important dynamic 
considerations.  
 
Regarding financial development literature, we move from the critical issues of documenting 
that markets are differently developed and asking why this is so, to the issue of how they develop. 
Focusing on the mechanism, the paper contributes to complementing the policy implications 
suggested by the literature. Improving investor protection and diminishing informational 
asymmetries certainly helps but would not be enough to trigger development in the presence of a 
listing decision that is this elaborate. Furthermore, the inherent dynamic externality behind the 
27 
 
development process opens the doors to policy interventions that go well beyond providing the 
basic contracting and property rights institutions. Finally, our results also provide a new measure 
of stock market development that may be useful for future research in the area. We show that our 
measure is similarly correlated to other variables that are typically thought to proxy for the deep 
determinants of financial development. Unlike the traditional measures, however, this one is not 
based on the size of the market and is well-grounded on one (albeit particular) mechanism 
through which markets would develop. 
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Tables 
 
 
 
Low High
Development Development
HH Firms 0.1343 0.0827
Max Share of Firms 0.2189 0.1720
C6 Firms 0.5915 0.5185 **
C4 Firms 0.4820 0.4155 *
HH Market Cap 0.2409 0.1752 *
Max Share of Market Cap 0.3642 0.2990 *
C6 Market Cap 0.8553 0.7282 ***
C4 Market Cap 0.7607 0.6325 ***
HH is the Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index averaged out across countries in each development group.
Max share is the weight of the industry with the highest share in the market averaged out across countries in each 
development group. C6 (C4) is the sum of the 6 (4) biggest industry shares in the country averaged out across
countries in each development group. Firms means that industry weights were computed as the number of listed
firms in each industry over each country's total. Market Cap means that weights were computed as the market
cap in each industry over each country's total. Firms were classified using the Fama French 48 industry
classification. Development groups were divided in high and low using the median of the ratio of number of firms
to population as a cutoff rule. Significance (p-value): * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Table 1: Less developed Markets are more Concentrated
 
 
 
Difference 
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Fama French Industry Industry Beta Low Development High Development Difference
Utilities 0.5088 0.0577 0.019 -0.0388 ***
Food Products 0.6828 0.0375 0.0231 -0.0143 **
Tobacco Products 0.7092 0.0082 0.001 -0.0072 **
Beer & Liquor 0.7308 0.0136 0.0082 -0.0054 *
Precious Metals 0.7504 0.0087 0.0114 0.0027
Petroleum and Natural Gas 0.762 0.0247 0.017 -0.0077
Candy & Soda 0.8082 0.0125 0.0055 -0.007 *
Communication 0.8204 0.0374 0.0265 -0.0109
Defense 0.8217 0.0012 0.0004 -0.0008
Shipping Containers 0.8286 0.0054 0.0048 -0.0006
Pharmaceutical Products 0.8375 0.0184 0.0166 -0.0018
Insurance 0.8518 0.0526 0.0281 -0.0245
Agriculture 0.8815 0.0187 0.0084 -0.0103 *
Medical Equipment 0.8953 0.0008 0.008 0.0071 ***
Consumer Goods 0.9044 0.0161 0.0134 -0.0027
Shipbuilding, Railroad Equipment 0.9383 0.0024 0.0015 -0.0009
Textiles 0.9475 0.0376 0.0148 -0.0228 ***
Fabricated Products 0.9641 0.0026 0.0037 0.0011
Chemicals 0.9789 0.0359 0.0165 -0.0193 ***
Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining 0.9799 0.0187 0.0139 -0.0048
Printing and Publishing 0.9802 0.0071 0.0119 0.0048 *
Business Supplies 0.9815 0.0128 0.0133 0.0005
Coal 0.9832 0.0061 0.0007 -0.0054 *
Automobiles and Trucks 0.988 0.0227 0.0149 -0.0077 *
Trading 0.9984 0.0401 0.0743 0.0343 ***
Real Estate 1.0293 0.0271 0.0447 0.0177 **
Banking 1.0322 0.1413 0.0718 -0.0694 **
Retail 1.0406 0.0336 0.04 0.0064
Rubber and Plastic Products 1.0477 0.009 0.0085 -0.0005
Miscellaneous 1.049 0.0037 0.0033 -0.0005
Transportation 1.0494 0.0209 0.0355 0.0146 **
Construction Materials 1.05 0.0512 0.0335 -0.0177 **
Apparel 1.0685 0.0098 0.0085 -0.0013
Wholesale 1.0776 0.0405 0.0647 0.0242 ***
Personal Services 1.0808 0.0016 0.0047 0.0031 ***
Aircraft 1.0829 0.0001 0.0019 0.0018 ***
Steel Works Etc 1.0925 0.036 0.0206 -0.0153 **
Restaraunts, Hotels, Motels 1.1018 0.0206 0.0162 -0.0044
Healthcare 1.1314 0.0037 0.0064 0.0028
Machinery 1.1681 0.0184 0.0407 0.0223 **
Computers 1.1772 0.0051 0.0326 0.0275 ***
Entertainment 1.2036 0.0055 0.0146 0.009 ***
Electrical Equipment 1.2393 0.0069 0.0122 0.0053 **
Construction 1.2533 0.0238 0.0312 0.0074
Business Services 1.392 0.0335 0.095 0.0615 ***
Recreation 1.4337 0.0013 0.0069 0.0056 ***
Electronic Equipment 1.446 0.006 0.0406 0.0346 ***
Measuring and Control Equipment 1.4516 0.0008 0.0088 0.008 ***
N 28 28
Table 2: Market Composition varies with development
The market share of each industry corresponds to the number of listed firms in each industry over each country's total averaged 
out across countries in each development group. Difference is the difference between High Development and Low
Development. Industry betas are computed by regressing the monthly excess returns of each industry against the complete
market excess return in the U.S. in the January 1973 to December 2003 period. Firms were classified using the Fama French
48 industry classification. Development groups were divided as high and low using the median of the ratio of number of firms to
population as a cutoff rule.  Significance (p-value): * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
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Listed Firms Economy Listed Firms Economy
Sector Industry Beta Share of Share of Difference Share of Share of Difference
Revenue Output Revenue Output
Utilities 0.509 0.1240 0.0332 0.091 0.0319 0.0218 0.010 0.081 **
Food & Beverages 0.741 0.0249 0.0639 -0.039 0.0427 0.0462 -0.004 *** -0.035 ***
Mining 0.869 0.2186 0.0202 0.198 0.0651 0.0183 0.047 * 0.152 ***
Agriculture 0.881 0.0082 0.0663 -0.058 0.0029 0.0285 -0.026 *** -0.032 ***
Products & Goods 0.909 0.0924 0.0711 0.021 0.1075 0.0505 0.057 -0.036
Transport, storage and communication 0.935 0.0961 0.0688 0.027 0.0997 0.0752 0.024 * 0.003
Finance and insurance 0.961 0.2081 0.0383 0.170 0.2275 0.0662 0.161 *** 0.008
Chemicals 0.979 0.0193 0.0303 -0.011 0.0180 0.0301 -0.012 *** 0.001
Wood, Furniture and Paper 0.981 0.0147 0.0290 -0.014 0.0294 0.0360 -0.007 ** -0.008
Textiles & Apparel 1.008 0.0109 0.0355 -0.025 0.0064 0.0127 -0.006 *** -0.018 ***
Real estate 1.029 0.0029 0.0385 -0.036 0.0052 0.0661 -0.061 *** 0.025 ***
Wholesale and retail trade, restaurants 1.073 0.0803 0.1344 -0.054 0.1235 0.1260 -0.003 *** -0.052
Steel Works 1.092 0.0439 0.0241 0.020 0.0554 0.0169 0.038 -0.019
Machinery & Equipment 1.118 0.0199 0.1086 -0.089 0.1077 0.1063 0.001 ** -0.090 ***
Education, health, social work and other 1.180 0.0045 0.1513 -0.147 0.0147 0.2105 -0.196 *** 0.049 ***
Construction 1.253 0.0206 0.0789 -0.058 0.0258 0.0683 -0.043 *** -0.016
Renting and Business Services 1.392 0.0108 0.0076 0.003 0.0366 0.0204 0.016 -0.013
Observations 13 13 21 21
High DevelopmentLow Development
Table 3: Share of Listed Companies Revenues vs Share of Economic Output by Development
Diff
 in
 Diff
Share of Revenues corresponds to the total revenues of listed firms in each industry over each country's total averaged out across the countries in each development group. Share
of Output is each industry's share in total output in the entire economy. The share of output is rebased so that the total in each country adds up to 100%. Industry beta is
computed by regressing the monthly excess returns of each industry against the complete market excess return in the U.S. in the January 1973 to December 2003 period.
Significance (p-value): * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Firms Beta Firms Beta Firms Beta Firms Beta
Ln (# Firms / Pop) 0.0222*** 0.0200*
(0.00515) (0.01031)
Market Cap to GDP 0.0568*** 0.0350**
(0.01475) (0.01411)
Ln (GDP pc) PPP 0.0053 0.0303***
(0.01674) (0.00849)
Constant 1.1806*** 0.8811*** 1.1055*** 0.6143***
(0.06061) -0.01267 (0.26778) (0.07364)
Observations 56 54 56 54
R-squared 0.333 0.239 0.334 0.333
The dependent variable (Firms Beta) is the country's firm weighted average industry complete-market beta. Ln (#
Firms / Pop) is our benchmark proxy for market development, Market Cap to GDP is an alternative market
development measure and Ln (GDP pc) PPP, the log of the country's gross domestic product per capita at power
purchasing parity, is used as a control for the country's economic development. Industry betas are computed by
regressing the monthly excess returns of each industry against the complete market excess return in the U.S. in the
January 1973 to December 2003 period. Firms were classified using the Fama French 48 industry classification.
Robust standard errors. Significance (p-value): * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Table 4: Cross Country Betas Regressions
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1991 2001
Ln (# Firms / Pop) -12.442 -11.402 ***
Market Cap / GDP 0.3503 0.7815 ***
Firms Beta 0.9967 1.0392 ***
Market Cap Beta 0.9537 0.9766 **
IPO Beta Market Beta
Complete Sample 1.0403 1.0159 **
Low Development 0.9854 0.9689
High Development 1.0952 1.0628 ***
Ln (# Firms / Pop) is the average logarithm of the total number of firms divided by population of each country. Market Cap / GDP is the
average total market capitalization over GDP, Firms Beta is the firm weighted average industry complete-market beta and Market Cap
Beta is the market cap weighted average industry complete-market beta of all countries that had at least 10 listed firms in the market on
the Worldscope database on 1991. IPO Beta is the firm weighted average industry complete-market beta of all the IPOs in countries that
had at least one IPO from 1990 to 2003 of the from the Thompson Financial's SDS Platinum database. Benchmark beta is the firm
weighted average industry complete-market beta of listed firms for 2001. Complete sample refers to the 54 countries that had at least one 
IPO from 1990 to 2003. Development groups were divided as high and low using the median of the ratio of number of firms to population
as a cutoff rule. Industry betas are computed by regressing the monthly excess returns of each industry against the complete market
excess return in the U.S. in the January 1973 to December 2003 period. Firms were classified using the Fama French 48 industry
classification. Robust standard errors. Significance (p-value): * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
Panel A. Markets are Developing
Panel B. IPO Betas are higher than Market Betas
Table 5: Further Evidence
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Panel A. Cross Country - Other Measures of Value
Ln (# Firms / Pop)
Constant
Observations
R-squared
Panel B. Cross Country - Weighting, Industry Aggregation, Industry Beta 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Market Cap Revenues Book Assets FF17 Industry Dummy Weighted Multifactor
Beta Beta Beta Aggregation Beta Firms Beta
Ln (# Firms / Pop) 0.0325*** 0.0318*** 0.0190*** 0.0139*** 0.0129*** 0.00847**
(0.00697) (0.00460) (0.00424) (0.00347) (0.00265) (0.00331)
Constant 1.334*** 1.338*** 1.202*** 1.170*** 1.146*** 1.184***
(0.0833) (0.0550) (0.0508) (0.0415) (0.0317) (0.0396)
Observations 56 56 56 56 56 56
R-squared 0.287 0.470 0.272 0.228 0.305 0.108
Panel C. Cross Country - Sample 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Firms Beta Firms Beta Firms Beta Firms Beta Firms Beta Firms Beta
25% Firms 50% Firms 75% Firms 25% Market Cap 50% Market Cap 75% Market Cap
Ln (# Firms / Pop) 0.0209*** 0.0184*** 0.0124* 0.0227*** 0.0261*** 0.0266***
(0.00533) (0.00550) (0.00622) -0.0046 -0.00496 -0.00545
Constant 1.1679*** 1.1435*** 1.0910*** 1.1869*** 1.224*** 1.2294***
(0.0604) (0.0613) (0.0671) (0.0534) (0.0578) -0.0627
Observations 43 39 30 53 50 46
R-squared 0.274 0.231 0.126 0.323 0.368 0.351
Table 6: Robustness
Firm weighted size is the industry-weighted average firm size in each country. Firm weighted market-to-book is the industry-weighted country
average market-to-book ratio in countries with low market development. Market cap beta, revenues beta and book assets beta are the country's
market cap, revenues and book assets weighted average industry complete-market beta. FF17 industry aggregation is the country's firm weighted
average industry complete-market beta using the Fama French 17 industry classification. Dummy weighted beta is the country's average industry
complete-market beta where industry weights are computed as one if there is at least one listed firm in the industry and zero otherwise. Multifactor
firms beta is the country's firm weighted average industry complete-market beta where the industry beta corresponds to the market beta of the
Fama French (1992) three factor model. Firms beta 25% firms, 50% firms and 75% firms are the country's firm weighted average industry
complete-market beta where the total number of firms of each country in the Worldscope database is at least 25%, 50% and 75% of the total
number of firms of the WDI sample respectively. Firms beta 25% market cap, 50% market cap and 75% market cap are the country's firm
weighted average industry complete-market beta where the total market capitalization of each country in the Worldscope database is at least 25%,
50% and 75% of the total market capitalization of the WDI sample respectively. Ln (# Firms / Pop) is our benchmark proxy for market
development. Industry betas are computed by regressing the monthly excess returns of each industry against the complete market excess return in
the U.S. in the January 1973 to December 2003 period. Firms were classified using the Fama French 48 industry classification. Robust standard
errors. Significance (p-value): * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
(1) (2)
Firm Weighted Firm Weighted
Market-to-Book Size
-0.03257** -48.1480***
(0.017008) (14.88536)
0.055 0.264
0.3034 190.1228
(0.19079) (165.93616)
56 56
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln (# Firms / Pop) 0.0215*** 0.0193*** 0.0198*** 0.022** 0.021** 0.021**
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Economy Value Added Beta 0.0533** 0.014
(0.020) (0.023)
Economy Output Beta 0.0576*** 0.014
(0.021) (0.023)
Constant 1.163*** 1.0430***  1.144*** 1.191*** 1.161*** 1.162***
(0.089) (0.076) (0.071) (0.103) (0.100) (0.100)
Observations 34 34 34 34 34 34
R-squared 0.320 0.444 0.466 0.283 0.290 0.291
Table 7: Controlling for the Composition of Production
Firms-beta, Market-cap-beta, Economy-value-added-beta, Economy-output-beta, and Sector-beta are the betas constructed by using the
number of firms, market capitalization, value-added, output and the 48 Fama-French industry average beta that belong to a single sector,
respectively, as the weight of the corresponding country-industry beta. Ln (# Firms / Pop) is our benchmark proxy for market
development. Industry betas were computed by regressing the monthly excess returns of each industry against the complete market
excess return in the U.S. during January 1973 to December 2003. Robust standar errors. Significance (p-value): * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.
Market Cap BetaFirms Beta
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Firms Beta Firms Beta Manufacturing Firms Beta Firms Beta Firms Beta
Beta
Ln (# Firms / Pop) 0.0202*** 0.0203*** 0.0221*** 0.0222*** 0.0212*** 0.0186***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
External Finance Dependence -0.116*
(0.063)
Asset tangibility -0.233
(0.234)
Total Factor Productivity 0.161***
(0.036)
Analyst Coverage -0.018
(0.013)
Segmentation -0.0589
(0.045)
Idiosyncratic Risk -1.306*
(0.6640)
Ln (# Firms / Pop) w/out 
Privatized 0.0220***
-0.0051
Constant -0.0586 1.224*** 1.018*** 1.215*** 1.315*** 1.190*** 1.181***
(0.685) (0.075) (0.101) (0.063) (0.114) (0.056) (0.060)
Observations 56 56 55 56 56 42 56
R-squared 0.384 0.382 0.678 0.341 0.370 0.442 0.329
Firms Beta 
w/out 
Privatized
Table 8: Alternative Explanations
Firms beta is the country's firm weighted average industry complete-market beta. Ln (# Firms / Pop) is our benchmark proxy for market
development. External finance dependence is the country's firm weighted Rajan and Zingales measure of external financial dependence. Asset
tangibility is the country's firm weighted ratio of fixed assets to total assets in each industry. Manufacturing Beta is the country’s firm weighted
beta of the manufacturing industry firms only. Total Factor Productivity is the country’s firm weighted 4-factor TFP of manufacturing industry
firms. Analyst Coverage is the country's firm weighted number of analysts that follow a firm in each industry. Idiosyncratic risk is the firm
weighted average of industry idiosyncratic risk. Ln (# Firms / Pop) w/out privatized is our benchmark poxy for market development without
counting firms that were listed as a government privatization. Firms beta w/out privatized is the country's firms weighted average industry
complete-market beta without including firms that were listed as a government privatization. Industry betas are computed by regressing the
monthly excess returns of each industry against the complete market excess return in the U.S. in the January 1973 to December 2003 period.
Firms were classified using the Fama French 48 industry classification. Robust standard errors. Significance (p-value): * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
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Country Ln (firms/pop) Mkt. Cap to GDP Firms Beta Mkt. Cap Beta Num Firms
Low 
Development
OECD sample
Argentina -13.1131 0.7910 0.8590 0.8493 73 1 0
Australia -9.6627 0.8665 0.9199 0.9742 1235 0 1
Austria -11.1115 0.1236 0.9483 0.9179 120 0 1
Barbados -12.4987 0.5455 0.7706 0.8373 1 1 0
Belgium -11.1160 0.6491 0.9490 0.9384 153 0 1
Bermuda -7.7551 0.8974 1.2229 27 0 0
Brazil -13.1907 0.2759 0.8699 0.8535 322 1 1
Canada -10.2842 0.9504 0.9105 0.9765 1062 0 1
Chile -11.4025 0.7456 0.8307 0.8476 172 0 0
China -15.3078 0.4976 0.9427 0.9247 286 1 1
Colombia -14.2452 0.0730 0.8925 0.9025 28 1 0
Czech Republic -12.4026 0.1395 0.7691 0.7857 42 1 1
Denmark -10.1713 0.5367 0.9588 0.9570 205 0 1
Egypt -15.3536 0.2836 0.8805 0.9334 14 1 0
Finland -10.4647 1.7159 1.0119 1.2659 148 0 1
France -11.1243 0.8565 0.9935 0.9307 873 0 1
Germany -11.4128 0.5429 0.9901 0.9361 910 0 1
Greece -10.4818 0.7211 0.9386 0.9672 297 0 1
Hong Kong -9.0569 2.9863 0.9799 0.9405 784 0 0
Hungary -12.4477 0.1131 0.8166 0.8277 40 1 1
India -14.8775 0.2081 0.9104 0.9826 357 1 1
Indonesia -13.4407 0.0770 0.9040 0.9107 304 1 1
Ireland -10.9931 0.6510 0.9448 0.9933 65 0 1
Israel -10.8337 0.5298 1.0188 1.0642 127 0 0
Italy -12.2432 0.5097 0.9347 0.8677 278 1 1
Japan -10.4946 0.5593 0.9900 1.0228 3517 0 1
Jordan -13.2339 0.6372 0.8804 0.9936 9 1 0
Liechtenstein -9.2904 0.9748 1.0647 3 0 0
Luxembourg -9.5288 1.3351 0.8951 1.2670 32 0 1
Malaysia -10.3520 1.3200 0.9475 0.9163 760 0 0
Mexico -13.6353 0.0924 0.9022 0.8969 119 1 0
Morocco -14.5496 0.2997 0.8731 0.9978 14 1 0
Netherlands -11.1700 1.2377 0.9766 0.9376 226 0 1
New Zealand -10.4442 0.3109 0.9180 0.9099 113 0 1
Norway -10.1351 0.3451 0.9634 0.9188 179 0 1
Pakistan -14.1040 0.0785 0.8407 0.8162 106 1 0
Peru -12.7964 0.1632 0.8449 0.8503 73 1 0
Philippines -12.8931 0.5063 0.8966 0.9609 197 1 0
Poland -12.9372 0.0946 0.9317 0.9682 93 1 1
Portugal -11.8570 0.4173 0.9521 0.9114 72 1 1
Republic of Korea -11.0582 0.4253 0.9562 1.0277 746 0 1
Russian Federation -15.2940 0.1585 0.7050 0.7045 33 1 1
Singapore -9.1450 1.3505 1.0141 1.0198 441 0 0
Slovakia -12.9331 0.0252 0.8277 0.8031 13 1 1
South Africa -11.5199 1.3127 0.9503 0.9184 445 1 1
Spain -12.3241 0.7150 0.9157 0.8825 181 1 1
Sri Lanka -13.7500 0.0509 0.8702 0.8964 20 1 0
Sweden -10.1690 1.1449 1.0329 1.0882 341 0 1
Switzerland -10.1484 2.2772 0.9351 0.8908 283 0 1
Taiwan -10.6947 0.8213 1.0287 1.1796 507 0 1
Thailand -12.0715 0.2638 0.9052 0.9484 350 1 0
Turkey -12.8953 0.0157 0.8890 0.9536 172 1 0
United Kingdom -10.4799 1.4407 1.0110 0.9565 1659 0 1
United States of America -10.4622 1.2290 1.0000 1.0000 8159 0 1
Venezuela -13.5231 0.0102 0.8888 0.8636 33 1 0
Zimbabwe -13.5963 0.4893 0.8693 0.9837 16 1 0
Mean -11.83 0.64 0.92 0.95 479.20 0.50 0.61
Median -11.47 0.52 0.92 0.94 172.00 0.50 1.00
Standard Deviation 1.77 0.59 0.07 0.11 1181.46 0.50 0.49
N 56 54 56 56 56 56 56
Table A.1 - Data Description
The table shows the list of the 56 countries with different measures of market develoment. Ln(firms/pop) is our benchmark measures of market
development. Market cap to gdp is an alternative measure of market development. Firms beta is the country's firms weighted beta. Market cap beta is
the country's market cap weighted beta. Num firms is the country's number of listed firs in 2001. Development groups were divided as high (0) and low
(1) using the median Ln (number of firms / population) as a cutoff rule. OECD is one (1) if the country has an OECD report an zero (0) otherwise.
Industry betas are computed by regressing the monthly excess returns of each industry against the complete market excess return in the U.S. in the
January 1973 to December 2003 period. Firms were classified using the Fama French 48 industry classification.
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Figure 1 – Market composition varies with the level of development 
The graph shows the difference between the average market share of high developed equity 
markets minus low developed equity markets against complete market industry beta. The market 
share of each industry corresponds to the number of listed firms in each industry over each 
country's total, averaged out across countries in each development group. Industry betas are 
computed by regressing the monthly excess returns of each industry against the complete market 
excess return in the U.S. over the January 1973 to December 2003 period. Firms were classified 
using the Fama French 48 industry classification. Development groups were divided as high and 
low using the median Ln (number of firms / population) as a cutoff rule. 
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Figure 2 – Complete Market Betas increases with Market Development 
 
The graph shows the country's firm weighted beta against Ln (# Firms / Pop) which is our 
benchmark proxy for market development. Industry betas are computed by regressing the 
monthly excess returns of each industry against the complete market excess return in the U.S. 
over the January 1973 to December 2003 period. Firms were classified using the Fama French 48 
industry classification. 
 
